






















development,	 infrastructure,	 services	 and	 programs	 alongside	 the	 more	 equitable	
distribution	of	wealth.	 In	a	first	moment,	 it	also	deployed	strategies	and	actions	towards	
penal	 moderation.	 However,	 since	 2010,	 it	 has	 changed	 dramatically,	 generating	 an	
astonishing	 punitive	 turn.	 The	 article	 concludes	 that	 law	 and	 order	 policies	 in	 Ecuador	







































Rafael	 Correa’s	 government	 reduced	 inequality,	 decreasing	 the	 Gini	 coefficient	 on	 income	
distribution	(where	0	corresponds	with	perfect	equality	and	1	with	perfect	inequality)	by	8	points	
(Correa	2014).	From	2006	to	2013	poverty	fell	from	37.6	per	cent	to	25.6	per	cent,	while	extreme	
poverty	 decreased	 to	 less	 than	 two	 digits,	 from	 16.9	 per	 cent	 to	 8.6	 per	 cent	 (Correa	 2014).	
Additionally,	 vast	 educational,	 health,	 energy	 and	 road	 infrastructure	 improvements	 were	
undertaken	by	the	political	process	known	as	the	‘Citizens’	Revolution’.	The	Citizens’	Revolution’s	
main	 platform	 was	 for	 State	 efficiency,	 meaning	 the	 return	 to	 a	 policy	 of	 constitutional	
administration.	 This	 policy	 had	previously	 earned	 positive	 recognition	 for	 the	 government	 in	





















It	 is	 characterized	 by	 an	 economic	 crisis	 and	 concomitant	 political	 instability.	 The	 crisis	 and	
instability	 were	 accompanied	 by	 the	 implementation	 of	 neoliberalism,	 which	 reduced	 the	










Sucre,	 was	 converted	 into	 the	 US	 dollar	 (equivalent	 to	 25,000	 Sucres).	 In	 the	 same	 year	 the	
European	 scriptural‐inquisitorial	 procedural	 model	 was	 transformed	 into	 an	 Anglo‐American	
oral‐accusatory	model.	The	promulgation	of	the	new	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure4	received	over	
US$1.5	 million	 in	 funds	 as	 an	 initiative	 from	 the	 United	 States	 Agency	 for	 International	
Development	(USAID)	(Sarles	2001)	and,	in	so	doing,	established	itself	as	the	emblem	of	judicial	




The	 transfer	 of	 the	 new	 procedural	 theory	 penetrated	 the	 judicial	 structures	 underneath	 the	
system’s	concept.	That	is	to	say,	it	politically	blamed	the	previous	model	for	the	administrative	
(dis)function	 (Schünemann	 2002).	 In	 doing	 so,	 not	 only	 the	 American	 economic	 model	 was	
emulated	 but	 also	 its	 criminal	 procedural	 tradition	 (Langer	 2008).5	 So,	 the	 reform	 began	 by	
securing	 the	Official	 Investigation	Model	 (Langer	 2001)	 but,	 in	 less	 than	 a	 year,	 Ecuador	had	






8,520	detainees,	 only	2,507	had	been	 convicted.	After	 the	 reform,	 the	 first	Assessment	of	 the	
Criminal	 Procedural	 System	 in	 Ecuador	 (Fundación	 Esquel‐USAID	 2003)	 revealed	 that	 the	
percentage	of	detainees	without	a	conviction	increased	by	7	per	cent.	This	turnaround	occurred	







Year	 Sentenced	 Percentage	 Not	sentenced	 Percentage	
Total	
detainees	
1990	 2275	 29.63	 5,404	 70.37	 7,679	
1991	 2373	 30.10	 5,511	 69.90	 7,884	
1992	 2473	 30.96	 5,525	 69.17	 7,998	
1993	 2845	 32.25	 6,000	 67.75	 8,856	
1994	 2745	 30.29	 6,319	 69.72	 9,064	
1995	 3225	 33.43	 6,451	 66.57	 9,646	
1996	 3078	 31.86	 6,883	 71.36	 9,961	
1997	 3094	 30.94	 6,412	 67.46	 9,506	
1998	 2405	 26.56	 6,650	 73.44	 9,439	
1999	 2507	 30.60	 5,688	 69.40	 8,520	






















extreme	 cases,	 one	 year.	 Some	months	 earlier,	 the	media	 had	 insinuated	 that	 the	 use	 of	 this	
reasonable	period	resulted	 in	 the	release	of	 ‘criminals’;8	 removing	 the	procedural	statute	 that	
violated	the	constitution	therefore	became	difficult.	Three	years	elapsed	before	the	Constitutional	
Court	declared	Law	2003‐101	–	a	 law	that	allowed	for	arrests	without	a	reasonable	detention	



































For	 years,	 oil	 companies,	 international	 cooperation,	 traditional	 parties,	 financial	 groups	 and	
interference	 from	 other	 nations	 had	 had	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 Ecuadorian	 economy.	 A	 young	
‘outsider’	economist,	Rafael	Correa	Delgado,	broke	through	with	a	new	discourse	that	promised	
to	 ‘restore	 hope	 amongst	 Ecuadorians’.	 Under	 his	 leadership	 the	 Citizens’	 Revolution,	 which	
proposed	State	recovery	through	a	new	institutional	 framework	aimed	at	 (de)corporatization,	
was	 born.	When	Delgado	 became	 president	 of	 the	 republic	 in	 2006,	 he	 formed	 a	 Constituent	
Assembly	in	the	city	of	Montecristi.	On	20	October	2008	Ecuador	released	a	new	constitution	that	
inaugurated	‘Good	Living’	or	Sumak	Kawsay	as	a	social	pact,	recognizing	norms	and	policies	for	











In	 an	 attempt	 to	generate	 institutional	 renewal	 from	scratch,	 the	elections	 in	2006	 led	 to	 the	




granting	 a	 general	 pardon	 to	 so‐called	 ‘drug‐mules’.	 On	 4	 July	 2008	 –	 coinciding	 with	
Independence	Day	in	the	United	States	–	the	Constituent	Assembly	suspended	the	punishments	
of	prisoners	who	had	carried	up	to	2,000	grams	of	any	illegal	drug.12	The	pardon	resulted	in	the	






men	 and	women,	 and	 the	 drug	 law	will	 also	 be	 revised,	 there	where	 it	 has	 no	





at	 investigating	 and	 punishing	 the	 weakest	 links,	 with	 serious	 suspicions	 that	 a	 significant	
number	of	detainees	could	be	mere	consumers	(Paladines	2014a).	In	2009,	for	example,	one	year	
after	the	implementation	of	the	general	pardon,	more	than	34	per	cent	of	the	prison	population	




the	 punitive	 discourse.	 Specifically,	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly	 adopted	 the	 constitutional	






















autonomy	 in	 2008.	 From	 2008	 to	 2014,	 the	 Ecuadorian	 Public	 Defense	 Office	 increased	 its	
number	 of	 staff	 to	 767	 Public	 Defenders	 nationwide	 (Defensoría	 Pública	 del	 Ecuador	 [Public	
Defender's	Office]	2014).	
	






absolute	 numbers	 from	 18,675	 detainees	 to	 10,881	 (see	 Figure	 3).	 The	 State	 recovery	 and	





















rights	violations	of	 their	predecessors.	The	Doctrine	of	National	Security	was	 implemented	 in	
Latin	 America	 to	 combat	 communism	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 1960s,	 and	 Ecuador	 experienced	 a	
spectacular	resurgence	in	forms	of	State	violence	between	1984	and	1988.	Thus,	during	Rafael	
Correa’s	first	term	of	government,	a	Truth	Commission	was	formed	to	investigate	crimes	against	































































the	 restoration	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Ecuador,	 it	 was	 the	 nation’s	 police	 that	 generated	 a	
conjuncture	with	similar	effects.21	
	














Citizen’s	 Revolution	 was	 threatened	 because	 it	 distorted	 the	 wealth	 distribution	 benefits,	
rewarding	 criminals;	 the	middle	 class	 began	 to	 share	 the	 selfishness	 of	 the	 upper	 classes	 in	
relation	to	the	ownership	of	private	property	 instead	of	adopting	humane	and	compassionate	




its	 execution.	After	 its	 publication	 in	 the	Official	 Register	 160	of	 29	March	2010,	 the	 counter	
reform	proposed:	i)	a	modification	to	consider	theft	a	misdemeanour	irrespective	of	the	amount;	




























The	 main	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Flagrancy	 Units	 were	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	
institutions	responsible	for	detention	management	to	start	with	the	communication	between	the	
police	agencies	and	other	Judicial	agencies,27	and	new	litigation	protocols	–	‘management	models’	





reduce	 impunity	 and	 contribute	 to	 improve	 security.	 (Comisión	 de	 la	 Verdad	
[Truth	Commission]	2013:	185)	
	
The	 rapid	 increase	 of	 the	 incarceration	 rate,	 became	 even	 further	 engrained	 due	 to	 the	
establishment	of	the	Flagrancy	Units	and	the	Iron	Fist	of	the	Home	Office	to	combat	crime.	At	the	
same	time	the	efficiency	of	the	police	 force	was	 taken	for	granted.	 In	 less	than	four	years,	 the	
incarceration	 rate	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 increased	 from	73	 (in	 2010)	 to	 165	 (in	 2014),	 an	
increase	of	over	120	per	cent.	In	absolute	numbers	this	meant	that,	in	2014,	there	were	13,155	
prisoners	 more	 than	 in	 2010	 (see	 Figure	 4),	 a	 peak	 that	 was	 even	 greater	 than	 the	 one	
experienced	during	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 long	neoliberal	 night	 between	2000	 and	 2006.	 In	 fact,	 the	
number	of	registered	prisoners	in	2014	was	an	all‐time	record	for	the	Ecuadorian	republic.		
	
The	 increase	 in	 the	 incarceration	 rate	 also	 coincided	 with	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 homicide	 rate.	
According	 to	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Interior	 and	 Security,	 the	 reduction	 reached	 plausible	 levels,	
decreasing	from	18.88	(2008),	18.74	(2009)	17.57	(2010),	15.36	(2011),	12.40	(2012)	and	10.87	
(2013)	to	8.30	(2014)	per	100,000	inhabitants	(Coordinator	of	the	Ministry	of	Security,	CEASI	
Statistics	2014).28	This	reduction	did	not	seek	 to	 justify	 the	 increase	 in	 the	prison	population,	


















in	 line	 with	 the	 Republican	 administrations	 of	 the	 United	 States	 (Wacquant	 2010).	 This	was	
essentially	 through	 the	 construction	 of	 three	 major	 regional	 detention	 centers	 at	 Guayaquil	
(Guayas),	 Latacunga	 (Cotopaxi)	 and	 Turi	 (Azuay),	 with	 a	 total	 cost	 of	 US$370	million.	 These	
prisons	had	the	capacity	to	accommodate	around	40,000	prisoners	and	were	aimed	at	averting	







portfolio	 was	 able	 to	 implement	 the	 new	 level	 through	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Ecuadorian	
Penitentiary	Management	Model	in	May	2013	which	covered	topics	that	had	previously	not	been	
included	in	Article	694	of	the	Integral	Organic	Criminal	Code	(IOCC).	As	a	consequence,	prisoners	




























08:00	 Breakfast	 is	 served	 in	the	bedrooms.	The	prisoners	hand	 in	 their	dishes	and/or	
utensils.		





















2009	 but	 with	 a	more	 punitive	 twist.	 It	 brought	 together	 270	 crimes	 and	 over	 a	 100	 traffic	
violations	 within	 a	 climate	 of	 punitive	 hardening	 (see	 Table	 3).	 In	 addition,	 it	 legitimized	
undercover	 investigations	 in	 Article	 640	which	 established	 the	 so‐called	 ‘direct	 proceedings’.	
These	 proceedings	 established	 a	 10‐day	 timeframe	 to	 trial	 and	 the	 possible	 sentencing	 of	
individuals	 for	 committing	 flagrancy	 cases	 to	 a	 maximum	 punishment	 of	 five	 years’	
imprisonment.	 The	 COIP	 came	 into	 force	 on	 10	 August	 2014,	 the	 date	 that	 the	 First	 Cry	 of	
Independence	 is	 celebrated	 in	 Ecuador.	 The	 COIP	 became	 the	 penal	 symbol	 of	 the	 Citizens’	

















































A	 year	 after	 the	 COIP	 had	 come	 into	 effect,	 President	 Rafael	 Correa	 regretted	 reducing	 the	
sentences	for	drug	related	crimes,	which	broke	with	the	consistency	generated	from	the	six	major	








Do	we	want	 to	 stop	 drug	use	 amongst	 our	 youth?	Then	 it	will	 be	 necessary	 to	
imprison	 the	 micro‐traffickers	 ...	 I	 have	 demanded	 that	 there	 will	 be	 harsher	
sanctions	 for	micro‐traffickers	 ...	 I	 have	 asked	 for	 the	 [sentencing]	 threshold	 to	
become	much	more	strict	in	cases	that	involve	H	[heroin],	which	is	destroying	our	











government	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 prohibitionist	 paradigm	 on	 drugs	 with	 more	 proportionate	
measures.	The	strategy	once	again	became	 ‘act	 strong	against	 the	weak	and	weak	against	 the	
strong’	(Paladines	2015;	Samper	2015).	The	government	thereby	restored	the	supposed	order	in	
‘urban	pathologies’	that	point	to	the	consumption	of	drugs	as	the	central	social	issue	(Wacquant	








among	others,	 requires	 to	generate	a	punitive	 turn	 in	criminal	 justice	policy...	During	 the	 first	
phase	of	the	Citizens’	Revolution	punitivism	was	substantially	reduced	due	to	the	construction	of	
a	political	space	in	which	guarantee	institutions	prevailed.	In	the	second	phase	this	approach	was	






Revolution.	 This	 political	 division	 in	 the	 approach	 to	 crime	 control	 post‐2009	 can	 also	 be	










Which	events	or	 scenarios	could	generate	 this	distinctive	division?	The	answer	alludes	 to	 the	
attempted	coup	on	30	September	2010	that	endangered	the	democratic	stability	of	the	country.	
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This	 interpretation	 of	 events	 leaves	 us	 with	 many	 questions.	 Was	 the	 Iron	 Fist	 a	 deliberate	


















The	 government	 of	 Rafael	 Correa	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 efficient	 team	 of	






by	 the	modernization	of	penal	 institutions	 through	costly	 infrastructure	 for	courts	and	by	 the	
introduction	 of	 Flagrancy	 Units.	 Accordingly,	 penitentiary	 modernization	 had	 never	 been	 as	




at	 the	 time	 (Echeverría	 1998:	 48),	 meaning	 politics	 operated	 under	 the	 belief	 system	 that	






The	 government	 of	 Rafael	 Correa	 has	 also	 been	 characterized	 by	 decision‐making	 through	
opinion	polls,	a	political	marketing	tool	that	had	generated	him	electoral	gain.	However,	passing	
all	policies	through	opinion	polls	can	also	mortgage	any	idea	for	change.	It	is	possible	that	the	














the	 Citizen’s	 Revolution	 was	 expressed	 through	 strong	 programs	 that	 reduced	 the	 levels	 of	




efficient	 role	 in	 avoiding	 impunity.	 However,	 the	 number	 of	 incarcerated	 individuals	 can	 not	
necessarily	be	explained	by	this	logic,	but	rather	by	the	possible	dysfunction	of	penal	institutions	





be	made	–	 is	 to	know	whether	 improvement	 in	 the	conditions	of	 the	 lives	of	Ecuadorians	has	
created	a	zero	tolerance	climate	in	relation	to	crime.	The	very	term	‘crime’	is	related	to	the	social	











security	 after	 30	 September	 2010	 in	which	 the	 logic	 to	 arrest	was	 confirmed	 by	 the	 logic	 to	
sentence.	 This	 is	 where	 the	 government	 possibly	 did	 not	 sufficiently	 consider	 recognised	






the	 past.	 If,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 socialism	 in	 the	 twenty‐first	 century	 is	 a	 leap	 towards	 a	more	
inclusive	society,	then	the	ongoing	increase	in	the	incarceration	rate	creates	the	notion	that	there	








the	 crisis,	 the	 Citizens’	 Revolution	 maintained	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 wealth	 continued	 to	































10For	the	 first	 time	persons	deprived	of	 their	 liberty	were	recognised	as	a	priority	group	under	the	constitution	 in	
Ecuador,	as	stated	in	Article	51.	













Minister,	 Gustavo	 Jalkh	 (2007‐2009),	 Nestor	 Arbito	 (2009‐2010),	 José	 Serrano	 (2010‐2012),	 Johanna	 Heaviness	
(2012‐2013),	Lenin	Lara	(2013‐2014)	and	Ledy	Zúñiga	(2014),	who	is	the	current	Minister.	






































agencies,	 even	 though	 some	 of	 them	 had	 no	 formal	 conviction.	 This	 campaign	 was	 also	 characterized	 by	 the	
publishing	of	fugitives’	photos	along	with	their	epithets	or	alias,	even	to	the	point	of	classifying	individuals	into	‘race’	
categories.	See:	http://www.ministeriointerior.gob.ec/tag/los‐mas‐buscados/	(accessed	4	May	2013).	
26See:	 http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/01/09/1/1355/si‐queremos‐meter‐manos‐cortes.html	 (accessed	 17	
December	2011).	The	reform	and	the	judicial	policy	was	questioned	about	its	independence	in	a	controversial	study	
by	Luis	Pásara,	with	the	title	‘The	judicial	Independence	of	the	Ecuadorian	justice	reform’	(2014).	
27Part	 of	 the	 coordination	 of	 law	 enforcement	 agencies,	 with	 judges	 in	 the	 Flagrancy	 Units,	 is	 dependent	 on	 new	
information	and	communication	technologies	 implemented	 in	 the	 fight	against	crime.	 In	 late	2011,	 the	expensive	
‘Integrated	Security	Service	ECU‐911’	was	implemented	under	the	concept	of	‘integral	security’.	The	operation	of	the	
National	 Police,	 the	 Armed	 Forces,	 the	 Fire	 Departments,	 the	 National	 Commission	 of	 Ground	 Transit	 and	
Transportation,	the	Ministry	of	Public	Health,	the	Ecuadorian	Social	Security	Institute,	the	National	Secretariat	for	
Risk	Management,	 the	Ecuadorian	Red	Cross	and	other	 local	 bodies	 responsible	 for	dealing	with	 emergencies	of	
citizenship	were	brought	together	under	this	service.	














force	 of	 over	 40,000	 employees,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 a	 complete	 reform,	 but	 rather	 waves	 of	 layoffs	 related	 to	 the	




35See:	 http://www.elcomercio.com/tv/gobierno‐alianza‐publico‐privada‐inversion.html	 (accessed	 25	 November	
2015).	
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